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1. Corporate governance is not just a relationship between principals and 
agents. 
2. Private benefits of control and its entrenchment are not just bad for 
corporate governance. 
3. Flexibility in legal distribution of corporate powers is a precondition for 
efficient separation of ownership and control. 
4. Shareholder protection by corporate law does not necessarily mean 
shareholder empowerment in corporate governance. 
5. In takeover regulation, unequal treatment of shareholders is generally 
preferable to the mandatory bid. 
6. Consumers and investors do not read standard forms or prospectuses; 
mandatory disclosure may still be efficient in spite of that. 
7. Compelling equal access to information undermines the incentives to its 
production. An “equilibrium degree of disequilibrium” is the most that 
can be expected from the dynamics of market prices. 
8. There are more numbers in comparative law than comparative law in 
numbers. 
9. One way to enunciate the Coase Theorem is that regulation is efficient 
inasmuch as it allows capturing net gains from trade. 
10. In a number of circumstances, regulation of potentially harmful activities 
is preferable to the punishment of behaviors resulting in actual harm to 
society. 
11. Like economists, Dutch people are into tradeoffs: they would trade their 
pancakes for adequate compensation. Like lawyers, Italian people prefer 
fairness: they would hardly trade their pasta for anything. Sometimes these 
people meet, eat pasta, and Italians pay. This is how Law and Economics 
flourishes. 
